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It is now generally accepted by researchers (although
not by governments) that famines are caused as much
by act of man as by act of god. But our understanding
of famine is still quite rudimentary, and what little we
know is rarely translated into policies to prevent or
control famine. Few people would argue that we
clearly understand what makes people vulnerable to
famine, or that we can predict that one group will be
vulnerable while another will not.
It is not even clear, when different people talk about
famine, that they are talking about the same thing.
Those who suffer from famine have a more exact
vocabulary than those who analyse it. Turkana
herders in northern Kenya distinguish ‘years in which
people died’ from years of less severe shortage (Swift
1985). In Darfur, the former contingency is known as
‘famine that kills’ (de Waal 1987) and in Hausaland,
northern Nigeria, as the ‘great hunger’ (Watts 1983),
to distinguish it from events in which there is
hardship but no large-scale mortality. Social and
economic analysts on the other hand, tend to lump
all major food shortages together as famine, and
populists use the term for any general shortage of a
desirable good, as in ‘book famine’.
There is even some doubt about what exactly a
famine is. Famine is traditionally seen as a food or
subsistence crisis, resulting from an absolute shortage
of food, or an inability by some groups to gain access
to food. Recently however, de Waal (1989) has put
forward a ‘health crisis model’ to replace this
‘starvation model’, arguing that most modern African
famines, especially Darfur in 1985–6 are in fact crises
of epidemiology and susceptibility to disease, caused
only indirectly – if at all – by a food crisis. I will
assume here, without making the point in detail,
that health crises and food crises are in fact closely
related, indeed that a more general crisis – a social
and economic crisis – is involved. I assume that the
danger of famine is of a sudden, catastrophic and
prolonged consumption deficit, accompanied by a
surge in disease, and by major social and economic
disruption. The order in which these occur and their
relation to each other is an urgent current research
priority, but it is not the subject of this article. Here I
use consumption deficit as a proxy for this complex
of dislocations.
Vulnerability is not simply another word for poverty.
Poor people are usually among the most vulnerable,
but understanding vulnerability means disaggregating
poverty. Landless labourers and people in informal
urban service trades, whose income in most years
may be as high or higher than poor farmers, are
often more vulnerable than the latter to a drought
or other disruption of the rural economy. Share-
croppers or even bonded labourers may be less well
off most of the time than small farmers, but have a
better guarantee of a subsistence minimum in bad
years. Small pastoralists may have a reasonable cash
income and high nutritional standards most of the
time, but are especially vulnerable to disruptions of
the livestock market or to epidemic animal disease.
In this article I analyse what makes people vulnerable.
This involves a further distinction between two levels
or categories of causation of famine. I distinguish
here between the proximate or intermediary variables,
which are the direct links to famine, and the indirect
or primary factors, which are the more general
ecological, economic or political processes
determining whether communities thrive or decline.
Drought, animal or plant disease, urban bias,
agricultural pricing policy, civil war and many others
are primary factors in determining vulnerability, but
they act in different and often complex combinations
through three proximate factors: production,
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exchange and asset processes. It is the role of these
proximate variables that is described here, since they
offer a way of classifying and understanding how
vulnerability is created and maintained, and possibly
how it can be reduced.
Production failures
Our first understanding of famine was that it is
caused mainly by production failures. We may picture
this as a simple cause and effect chain as follows:
Factors which act on the production box, and which
can lead to consumption failure, include drought,
flood, or animal and plant disease. Vulnerability is
increased or decreased by general ecological
potential (low potential leads to low and variable
production and thus to higher risk of production and
consumption failure), technology, crops and cropping
strategies, and the possibility of alternative income-
generating strategies. In this production-based view,
famine vulnerability is mainly the result of uncertain
production, and famine is directly caused by
production failure, due for example to drought (the
African famines of the 1910s, 1970s and 1980s), to
animal disease (the African famines of the 1890s,
following a rinderpest pandemic), to plant disease
(the Irish potato famines), or even to the refusal of
farmers to cultivate (one official view of the
Ukrainian famine of the 1930s).
Exchange failures
Building on the insights of the Indian famine
commissioners since the 1860s, Amartya Sen showed
in a classic book, Poverty and Famines (Sen 1981), that
famines could, and often did, take place where there
was no production failure, or where food was readily
available. He identified failures in the exchange or
market mechanisms as a key cause of famine among
poor people. Sen argued that the value of poor
people’s production activities or endowments – their
labour, cash crops, or animals – is liable to collapse in
relation to staple food prices. When this happens,
poor people starve, not because there is no food
available (the production failure view), but because
they cannot afford to buy food: the wage labour rate
or the value of their animals or cash crops is too low
in relation to food prices for them to acquire enough
calories. We may think of this as a failure in terms of
trade, or an exchange rate failure. Sen’s case histories
show that exchange rate failures of this sort are an
important trigger for famine in Africa and Asia.
The two main sources of terms of trade vulnerability
for the rural poor are the wage labour market and
commodity markets for agricultural and pastoral
products. We may add these to the diagram of the
famine causal chain.
Sen’s analysis identified some important sources of
vulnerability. He showed for example that, especially
in South Asia, agricultural wage labourers and people
in small-scale service trades are particularly
vulnerable because of the sensitivity of their wage
rates to changes in the wider economy. In Africa,
with the possible exception of Sudan, this is not so
much the case because of the much smaller
proportion of people in such employment: African
casual and informal sector urban wage labour
markets seem less volatile and immediately
responsive to external shocks and production crises
such as droughts. In Sudan however, variability in
seasonal agricultural wage labour rates is an
important source of vulnerability.
On the other hand, in Africa it is the pastoral
economies that form a major population group
vulnerable to terms of trade failures. African
pastoralists now get a large part of their subsistence
through market exchanges or barter deals. West
African pastoralists almost all get more than half
their total calorie intake in cereal form, acquired by
the sale or barter of animals or animal products. In
Sudan and East Africa, the proportion is more
variable, with some pastoral groups still heavily
dependent for calorie intake on milk, meat and
sometimes blood produced within the household,
although even these groups depend much more on
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cereal markets in bad years. Pastoral terms of trade
under normal circumstances mean that calories of
animal origin are considerably more expensive
(usually in the range of two to five times more) than
calories of vegetable origin. This means that
pastoralists can usually get cereals at a substantial
discount in exchange for animal products through
the market.
It does however make pastoralists especially
vulnerable to change in the normal animal-to-cereal
price ratios. If animal prices fall (because animals are
in poor condition, or many herders are selling, or
few people want to buy), pastoralists face an
exchange crisis even if the price of cereals does not
rise, although the same forces that bring down
animal prices are likely to push up cereal prices. All
recent African famines in pastoral areas have been
characterised by this price scissors effect. Of course,
such failures in the exchange box in the diagram
above are compounded by failures in the production
box. Often the same events – drought or animal
disease – trigger failures in both boxes at once, with
a synergistic effect on consumption patterns.
Sen’s analysis has made a major contribution to our
ability to understand how famine works, and by
focusing attention on exchange or terms of trade
relationships helps identify the people and
communities most vulnerable. But it leaves several
important questions without an answer:
z Although exchange rate failures can be an
important famine trigger, in fact they do not help
very much in understanding or predicting the
timing of the onset of the sudden collapse in
people’s ability to feed themselves, and they offer
very little explanation of the apparent cumulative
vulnerability of some communities. The
breakdown in a community’s ability to provide for
itself, or in the ability of some members to
provide for themselves, often happens some time
after the failure of exchange or terms of trade
relationships, just as it may occur one or two
years after the onset of drought. Indeed the
collapse sometimes takes place when the
production and exchange situations appear to be
improving. It seems as though there is a
threshold of individual and community
impoverishment, not immediately explained by
production or exchange factors, at which the
ability of households or communities to survive
collapses. In a wider sense, the explanation is an
ahistorical one, unable to cope with changing
vulnerability over time except by pointing to
changing exchange or terms of trade risk. In fact,
Sen’s analysis treats each crisis as a new event,
unrelated to earlier or later crises.
z Sen does not adequately explain the differential
vulnerability within some communities or between
similar communities apparently facing similar
production or exchange failures. Two examples
will illustrate this: (a) in the West African Sahel,
some pastoral communities such as the Tuareg are
divided into ethnically stratified groups of free
people and former slaves; these groups may now
be equally poor, but they do not seem to be
equally vulnerable to famine; (b) refugees in camps
near capital cities (e.g. Khartoum) are not as
vulnerable as refugees in rural camps (e.g. in south
Kordofan or Darfur), even though the former
have no more resources than the latter, and are
equally affected by exchange failures.
z Sen’s work has the virtue of focusing on the
differential role of poverty within communities,
but has problems as an analytic tool since it looks
mainly at households; it does not help very much
in analysing differential vulnerability between
individuals within households, nor to certain aspects
of vulnerability of entire communities.
z The work does not help us understand apparent
differences between communities in their
expectations of government assistance. Ethiopian
villagers apparently readily move to the roadside
or to administrative centres in times of crisis;
Sudanese villagers in Darfur and most Sahelian
pastoralists do not. Such differences are an
important part of vulnerability and are also crucial
to planning a relief effort, but exchange failures
do not have an explanation.
z Sen’s work does not explain the behaviour of
many households faced by famine, who may go to
considerable lengths to preserve their assets at
almost any cost. The case of households which
send some members to relief camps where
mortality is known to be high, rather than further
deplete their assets, or refrain from cutting down
valuable trees or selling their last animals are well
documented (e.g. see de Waal (1987) on Darfur).
Indeed, people in relief camps, despite the
degradation and health dangers, commonly hoard
relief food in order to acquire further assets, or to
delay the moment when they have again to live
from productive assets.
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z The work does not satisfactorily explain what
happens after a famine, when production and
exchange relationships return almost to normal,
although some households and communities
remain much more vulnerable than others in ways
production or exchange failures cannot
satisfactorily account for.
z Sen’s work treats war and civil disturbance as
external to the model. Yet clearly civil war and
other major disturbances are crucial to
understanding vulnerability and famine in
situations as different as Ethiopia, Sudan,
Mozambique and Kampuchea.
Sen is aware of these problems. The main statement
of his argument in Poverty and Famines tries to deal
with them by broadening the field of concern to the
concept of entitlements, rather than the narrower
notion of exchange or terms of trade relationships.
Entitlements, as defined by Sen, include all the
productive resources owned by a household, including
its labour power, and all its tangible assets; Sen also
includes, although almost as an afterthought, social
security provided by the state. However in his detailed
analysis of cases, he deals almost entirely with
production and exchange failures, concentrating on
the relative role of each in the genesis of particular
famines. Under the label of entitlements, he is in fact
concerned with wage labour rates and livestock prices
relative to grain prices.
As Sen himself states, his analysis is a sophisticated
poverty analysis, and famine vulnerability is treated as
synonymous with poverty. In his view (a) vulnerability
to famine is a direct function of relative poverty, and
(b) relative poverty is a direct function of a
household’s ownership of tangible resources or
endowments (labour, land, animals), and the rate at
which it can exchange these for food.
We may ask whether either of these propositions
is entirely true. Are the poorest people, and only
the poorest people, the most vulnerable to famine?
Is their poverty – defined in terms of the ownership
(in a liberal, market economy sense of ownership)
of mainly physical endowments – the main cause of
their vulnerability? I think this may not be so, as I
will attempt to show in the following argument. In
particular, perhaps we need to introduce a better
concept of risk – risk of future catastrophic collapse
of consumption – into the definition of
vulnerability.
Assets
Can we improve our understanding of vulnerability
and famine by including in the model a more
detailed analysis of the role of assets in a wide
sense? This means separating out the terms of trade
part of Sen’s entitlement analysis, confining it to
questions of exchange rate failure, and then analysing
in more detail the other types of entitlement hinted
at by Sen. By assets in this context I mean a wide
range of tangible and intangible stores of value or
claims to assistance which can be mobilised in a crisis.
A preliminary list of household assets relevant to
famine vulnerability might be as follows, subdivided
somewhat arbitrarily into investments, stores and
claims:
z Investments
– human investments, including investments in
education and health;
– individual productive assets, including animals,
farming equipment, houses and domestic
equipment, land, trees, wells;
– collective assets, such as soil conservation or water
harvesting works, irrigation systems, access to
common property resources.
z Stores
– food stores, granaries, etc.;
– stores of real value, such as jewellery, gold;
– money or bank accounts.
z Claims
– claims on other households within the community,
for production resources, for food, labour or
animals;
– claims on patrons, big men, chiefs or other
communities for help in need;
– claims on government;
– claims on the international community.
Assets in this broad sense (including investments,
stores and claims) are created when production leads
to a surplus beyond immediate consumption
requirements, and households use this surplus,
willingly or unwillingly, to invest (including
investment in better education or health), to build up
physical stores of all sorts, and to ‘invest in claims’ by
putting more resources into the community or
government. This last category covers a wide range,
including stock friendships, common among African
pastoralists, whereby animals are loaned between kin
and friends, other sorts of loans and gifts, traditional
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tribute and tax payments, contributions to
community funds and resources, and the payment of
taxes and other contributions to government.
Many of these assets are cashed in when households
face a crisis: production assets are sold, granaries are
emptied, jewellery is sold, bank accounts emptied,
loaned animals recalled, labour debts called in and
community support mechanisms activated. The
sequence in which these assets are called in at
different levels of crisis is an important theme for
famine research. The sequence is mainly determined
by the status of different categories of asset.
Investments and stores are generally resources under
the individual control of households, and can be
mobilised by that household alone or in conjunction
with others (in the case of collective assets); claims,
on the other hand, refer to a range of wider social
and political processes, whose activation depends on
some level of collective decision.
Assets create a buffer between production,
exchange and consumption. Production and
exchange activities create assets, and in case of need
assets can be transformed back into production
inputs. Alternatively assets can be transformed
directly into consumption, or indirectly through an
exchange mechanism. Diagram 3 adds assets to the
picture of casual pathways between production,
exchange and consumption.
The notion of claims in this respect is shorthand for a
variety of redistributive processes within smaller and
larger communities, ranging from households and
extended families, through shallow kinship groupings
to major lineages, and up to the level of traditional
and modern political formations. At the simplest
level, groups of kin and friends help each other with
food, labour or other resources. Such gifts and loans
are made with varying expectations of reciprocity,
but all involve an implicit recognition that
membership of a community involves both an
obligation to share resources, and a right to support
from the community in case of need. In some cases
this idea of reciprocal support goes so far as to
throw doubt on the comparability of customary
notions of private property with the classical liberal
economy view, which is an important part of Sen’s
concept of entitlement. In many African pastoral
economies, for example, the idea of private
ownership of animals, especially large stock, is
tempered by an ideology of collective clan property
in the same animals, through which the clan as a
whole has the duty and the power to redistribute
animals from wealthier to needier people in a crisis.
At higher sociological levels, within both traditional
and modern polities, the notion of claims merges
with ideologies of community redistributive taxes
(such as the zekkat now common in one form or
another in Islamic Africa) designed to ensure survival
of the poor in a crisis. The range of traditional
institutions achieving the same end – collective work
parties, shared meals, community granaries, rain-
making ceremonies or collective prayers in times of
food shortage which include the redistribution of
food or money from richer to poorer – is very large
in Africa. At a different level, destitute members of
one community may go to other communities to
beg for work or charity. An undocumented and
largely unanalysed aspect of recent famines is the
way many slightly less poor rural communities have
helped slightly poorer communities to survive – an
act of apparent altruism explainable in terms of risk-
aversion in a longer perspective.
Claims on government are a particularly interesting
case. In many types of rural society, payments or
labour services to a dominant traditional political
authority do create an expectation of a social
contract, under which the political authority is
expected to help in a crisis by redistributing food. The
way this operated to avert famine has been well
documented by Cissoko (1968) for the Songhay
empire in the Niger river valley in Mali for the
century or so before the chaos caused by the
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Moroccan invasion at the end of the sixteenth
century. Traditional political authorities in many parts
of the African dry belt continue to fulfil this function
to a limited extent, and at an anecdotal level there
are many stories of prosperous chiefs ruining
themselves to keep their followers alive in the recent
droughts; at the very least this suggests an ideology
of sharing in a crisis.
This is not a plea for a pre-colonial ‘merrie Africa’ in
which everyone shared and there was no famine.
The model proposed here is close to Watts’ (1983)
reformulation, in respect of famine vulnerability in
the Sokoto Caliphate in northern Nigeria, of the
moral economy argument of Thompson (1971) and
Scott (1976). The risk-avoidance strategies of pre-
capitalist rural societies extend beyond agricultural
and pastoral techniques into social and political
mechanisms which include, at one level, more
formalised expectations about the role of patrons or
elite classes in ensuring peasant subsistence needs in
a crisis. This normative subsistence guarantee spreads
throughout the peasant universe in widening circles
of responsibility, from the household, to extended
kin, to village or pastoral clan patrons or superior
classes, and ultimately to the state itself. This model
does not suppose that villages or pastoral clans are
corporate entities without class or status divisions;
indeed, the moral economy emerges as the
outgrowth of class struggle over the subsistence
minimum and surplus appropriation. Governments,
elites or the wealthy control the poor but depend on
revenue derived from them. Within a common field
of force, the moral economy is necessary to the
survival of both ruler and ruled (Watts 1983: 104–9).
Colonial and post-colonial governments in Africa
have not been very clear about their responsibilities
in this respect. The growth of commodity production
and market relations has strengthened food security
in some aspects, but has also undermined the
redistributive guarantees of the pre-colonial
economy, replacing them with an uncertain market
mechanism. As modern government has taken over
the powers of traditional political authorities, it has
expropriated the assets of rural people (including
their stores, physical investments and collective
investments). It has also imposed a substantial tax
burden, offering in theory in return some social
security in the most general sense. But although no
colonial or post-colonial government in Africa would
presumably deny a responsibility to keep its citizens
alive in a famine, few would go as far as the 1880
Indian Famine Commission report, which stated:
... there can be no doubt that a calamity such as
famine ... is one which a country such as India
wholly transcends individual effort and power of
resistance. It accordingly becomes the paramount
duty of the State to give all practicable assistance
to the people in time of famine, and to devote all
its available resources to this end. (quoted in
Drèze 1988: 13–14)
To what extent people feel they have a claim on the
government in a crisis in unclear. Urban people
certainly do, and successfully exercise that claim.
Rural people seem much more ambiguous and varied
in their responses: some do appear to call on the
government not to let them starve, others do not. It
would be an interesting research question to relate
this to the tradition of effective central authority and
high tax payments. Do communities, for example in
the central Ethiopian highlands, where there is a
long tradition of this sort, have a greater expectation
of government support in a crisis? Do they ‘call in
their claim’ more readily, abandoning efforts at self-
help much earlier than communities where there is
no such tradition, such perhaps, as Darfur (in terms
of its expectation of the Sudan central government)
or many Sahelian pastoral groups?
Reducing assets (including claims) makes households
and communities more vulnerable, and the analysis
could probably be extended to processes within
households, particularly in respect of gender and
intergenerational assets and claims. But this
vulnerability will not be easily visible. Even tangible
assets, such as granaries or livestock are often
concealed to avoid expropriation by government, and
many assets are intangible. People may survive for a
year or more of crisis by cashing in physical assets
and calling in claims, and then exhaust them so that
their ability to survive appears suddenly to collapse,
perhaps even at a time when production or
exchange relations are improving.
The poorest people have fewest assets, so in general
the poorest households reach the threshold of
collapse much faster than others. Within socially
stratified communities, low-status groups have
fewest claims, and so may reach the threshold faster
than their other asset holdings might predict. But
low asset status is not necessarily synonymous with
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greatest poverty. The urban poor, and refugees in
camps close to large towns, though often very poor,
do seem able to exercise effective claims on the
government for preferential assistance, in a way poor
rural people generally cannot.
The way nearly destitute people try desperately to
protect their assets in itself suggests something of
their importance, both for survival in a crisis, and for
recovery afterwards.
Historical changes in vulnerability
The asset status of rural communities does not remain
static, and the way it evolves is a prime determinant of
changing vulnerability. To illustrate this, I look at the
case of Sahelian West Africa, shown in Diagram 4.
It is difficult to summarise complex historical trends
into a single score, but we must try. Taking first the
production box, and considering processes in the
twentieth century only, we may make the following
estimates. Climatic factors have been quite mixed, as
has general ecological potential, with dry periods
causing regression of vegetation and crops, and wet
periods their recovery. Agricultural technology has
probably on balance had a beneficial effect, although
the pattern with crops and cropping is less clear,
with some improved food crops but very uneven
experience with cash crops. The possibilities for off-
farm production activities have probably substantially
improved. In summary, the production box probably
deserves a mixed plus-minus mark.
In the exchange box, wage labour possibilities have
probably substantially increased. The picture for
commodity markets is more uneven. Pastoral
markets have improved markedly, even though terms
of trade remain vulnerable. In agricultural markets,
cash crops have offered much wider income-
generating opportunities, although prices have
varied; food crop markets have generally declined.
The exchange box also gets on balance a plus-minus
mark, perhaps with more pluses than minuses.
The picture for the assets and claims box is more
complicated still. Human investments, in health and
education mainly, have probably improved, but most
other investments have declined, especially collective
investments in production-enhancing technologies
and common resource management; investments
deserves a plus-minus mark.
Stores and claims on the other hand, have declined
in a fairly unequivocal way, with the exception of
claims on the international community, which have
only worked late and inefficiently. Both deserve
negative marks.
The picture of historical changes in famine
vulnerability, with the estimated marks for positive or
negative changes in vulnerability, is shown below.
Such an exercise is very superficial, although no
doubt it could be done more rigorously. It does,
however, suggest that there has not been an equal
increase in vulnerability in all boxes of the model. The
situation has in fact been very mixed. However, if
these marks make any sense, the assets box has seen
a clear decline, meaning greatly increased
vulnerability from this source. Is this a real marker to
one of the reasons for increased vulnerability to
famine in such Sahelian populations?
Put another way, has the increased economic
integration of the traditional Sahelian economies
with wider markets, and the corresponding decline
in local circulation of goods and services, achieved
important economic benefits for most producers,
but at the cost of significant increases in two sorts
of vulnerability: increased dependence on market
transactions with corresponding vulnerability to
terms of trade failure, and a reduction in physical
assets and effective local claims, inadequately
compensated by a non-functional social contract
with central government?
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Conclusions for famine policy
The analysis of assets and claims does appear to add
something to our understanding of famine
vulnerability in addition to the insights from analysis
of production and exchange failures. It gives a clearer
idea of the way famine is generated, who suffers
most, the chronology of economic and social collapse,
and the thresholds at which different groups become
utterly destitute. It explains why war and civil unrest,
the most obvious break in the moral economy and
abrogation of claims by government, are a crucial
cause of vulnerability. It also explains more about
household and community strategies to avoid famine
and rebuild a life afterwards. It answers most of the
questions raised earlier about entitlement theory.
Perhaps it also helps us to ask more appropriate
questions about the apparent difference between
recent African and Indian famines. Those who are most
vulnerable to famine in India (especially agricultural
labourers and petty commodity and services producers)
are not necessarily the most vulnerable in Africa (with
the possible exception of Sudan). Income failures for
such people seem the most important cause of Indian
famines. Is this true of Africa? Are assets more
important to the survival of rural people in Africa than
they are in India, and asset failure thus catastrophic?
Are claims to community support more effective in
Africa most of the time, but the situation resultingly
catastrophic when such support breaks down?
Perhaps most significantly, does the Indian government
now accept claims on it by starving people, as the 1880
Famine Commission urged it should, and so do
something about them (through famine codes,
employment guarantees, fair price shops, cattle camps),
in a way that African governments do not?
If this way of looking at famine vulnerability has
some virtue, it has clear implications for policy. A
policy to reduce vulnerability would not then
necessarily be the same as a policy against poverty,
although it would have much in common, nor would
it be the same as a food policy, although a food
policy should include a policy on reducing
vulnerability. A vulnerability policy should include
actions in the fields of production, exchange and
assets. Some potential policy areas would include:
z Early warning. Low asset status in rural
communities would be a particularly good
indicator of vulnerability.
z Exchange interventions. Interventions in the
wage labour market (through employment
guarantees) and in commodity markets (through
price support) would reduce vulnerability.
z Improving assets and claims. The main problem
is how to rebuild the asset status of rural
communities in both tangible and intangible
assets. Making it easier for people to invest in
health and education would help – few
households with one educated member starve,
perhaps precisely because such people can
effectively activate claims for assistance from the
government. Government can assist
recapitalisation and collective investments in
productive technologies. Cereal policy, instead of
emptying household and community grain stores,
should help keep them full; the same should apply
to bank accounts, other stores of value, and
perhaps even to new forms of insurance. Policy
should revitalise and strengthen systems of claims
and responsibilities, starting with a clearer and
more effective view of government responsibility
and the legitimacy of claims against it in a food
crisis, but extending to and including systems of
local community support.
There are also lessons for emergency relief and food
aid. Rehabilitation of rural economies after famine
means not only reinstating their production status,
and ensuring that their exchange and terms of trade
relations are acceptable. It also means the much
longer tasks of rebuilding their asset status, and their
own social frameworks through which claims and
asset sharing are organised. At present, relief tends
to undermine local organisational capability by
imposing procedures dictated by an understandable
desire for efficiency, donor accountability and short-
term cost-effectiveness. But local community
structures are bypassed whenever relief food is
distributed to those who qualify on a nutrition status
criteria, or food-for-work is organised in labour
gangs for projects decided and administered by the
relief agency. If local organisational capacity is an
important resource in making communities less
vulnerable, actions such as these, even if they save
lives in the short run, contribute to greater
vulnerability in the long run. Food aid in particular, in
relief programmes, should be used not only to save
lives but also to protect assets; in rehabilitation
programmes, food aid should be used more explicitly
to rebuild household and community assets, and to
rebuild local organisational capability.
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